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Abstract 
When Erdogan and his party, the AKP, were elected for the first time in 2002, they made 
several important pledges. None of these have been fulfilled. On the contrary, in recent years 
the conflict between Turks and Kurds has increased and societal divisions are at boiling point. 
Unless relations between Turks and Kurds improve, this article contends that it is not possible 
to resolve the other pressing issues. Under an Erdogan-led regime Turkey has become a rogue 
state which is now heading towards civil war. This article begins by arguing that there has 
never been a real Turkish-Kurdish peace process. The outcomes of the research reported here 
show that the aim of past negotiations – for both the Erdogan-led AKP government and the 
PKK – is actually to monopolise power and violence, rather than to move towards sustainable 
peace. The second argument is that diaspora, especially for stateless people, is not just a ‘home 
away from home’. The underlying concern tackled here is how successful negotiations for 
peace and post-conflict societies can be reached with the help of different stakeholders, 
including diasporas. The article includes a case history of Kurdish alternative legal practice, 
which shows that diaspora communities are not only idealistic protesters, but can also act as 
positive agents and create practical solutions for stateless communities. Finally, the article 
suggests 15 practical steps towards a sustainable peace. 
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Truth is the first casualty of War (Aeschylus, 525 BC - 456 BC) 
Introduction 
The conflict between the Turkish state and Kurds is intensifying both in 
Turkey and in the neighbouring states. Between 1984 and 2015 around 50 
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thousand people died as a result of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. Millions of 
people were internally and internationally displaced. Hundreds of billions of 
dollars were wasted on this conflict by the state. Unfortunately there is not 
only a lack of substantive progress, but also an actual worsening of the 
situation. In the nine months following the June 2015 Turkish general election 
and significant political losses for the AKP, six thousand Kurds (including 
civilians and PKK militants) and 400 Turkish soldiers and police officers have 
been killed (ICG Report 2016; Reuters 2016; Zalewski 2016).  
Seven cities and 17 towns have been significantly affected by ongoing Turkish 
attacks including bombardment. More than 300 thousand Kurdish people 
have lost their homes. Large parts of cities in south-eastern Turkey, 
particularly Cizre, Sur, Nusaybin and Idil have been razed to the ground. 
Deportations of civilians and destruction of cities and towns continue (BBC 
2016a; ICG Report 2016). This is equivalent to, or even worse, than the first 
year (2011) of the recent conflict in Syria. Unsurprisingly, around 30 percent 
of the whole Turkish population – not just Kurds – now want to leave the 
country (Cumhuriyet 2016). 
In the recent years, conflicts between Turks and Kurds have increased and 
societal divisions are at boiling point. One of the main reasons for this is that 
successive Turkish governments are more interested in maintaining their 
own power than in any real attempt at peace-making with Kurds. Unlike 
commonly assumed, Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK; Partiya Karkerên 
Kurdistanê) is not the reason for conflicts between Turks and Kurds but, in 
fact, is the product of this almost century-long problem. Thousands of young 
people join the PKK voluntarily every year. Forced migration, unequal 
citizenship and an unsafe living environment means that Kurds are living in 
exile conditions within Turkey and the neighbouring countries. As long as 
these exile conditions continue, the PKK and similar organisations will not 
only exist but will also thrive.  
Recent conflicts in Kurdish cities in Turkey show that Kurdish youth 
organisations are more radical than the PKK. They have even criticised the 
PKK, about its very ‘soft’ and ‘humanistic’ attitude towards the Turkish state. 
These youth organisations such as the YDG-H (Yurtsever Devrimci Gençlik 
Hareketi: The Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement) and Kurdistan 
Freedom Falcons (TAK) want more radical actions, to at least equalise the 
state’s actions against Kurds. Two suicide bombs in Ankara in recent months 
by one of the Kurdish youth organisations, TAK, killed many soldiers and 
civilians, and showed what kind of action they mean.   
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In 2002 when elected for the first time, Erdogan and his Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) made six important pledges. These were: to 
develop ‘a new pluralistic constitution which respected the ethnic and 
religious diversity of the country’; to establish a ‘strong democracy’; to 
strengthen the ‘rule of law’; to respect ‘freedom of speech’; ‘to have zero 
problems with neighbours’ and ‘to find a peaceful resolution with the Kurds’. 
None of these pledges have been fulfilled. On the contrary: Turkey is in the 
15th year of an Erdogan-led government, and all of these six areas are in a 
worse state than before. In the 2016 World Press Freedom Index, Turkey is 
ranking 151. This is lower than Russia, Pakistan, South Sudan, Zimbabwe, 
Afghanistan and almost the same level as the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(RSF 2016). In this article, I want to focus primarily on the worsening of the 
Turkish-Kurdish conflict. Unless this improves, I contend that it is not 
possible to resolve the other five pledges. The Erdogan-led regime has not 
only put Turkey into a rogue situation, but the state is now heading towards 
a civil war (Ellis 2016; Ignatius 2016; Kuntz et al. 2016). 
Methodology 
In order to explore individual and family Kurdish experiences in different 
diasporas and their involvement in homeland politics, conflict and peace, I 
carried out multi-sited ethnographic qualitative research (as described in 
Marcus 1995) between December 2012 and March 2016. Multi-sited research 
technique are suitable to capture the transnational flow of Kurds that are 
dispersed across Middle East and Europe. The fact that Kurds are stateless. 
This methodological approach capture the informal flow of people, 
knowledge, and power across nation-boarders. This included four focus 
groups and 52 in-depth, open-ended qualitative interviews involving 
individuals originating from different Kurdish regions. The research 
involved a total of 85 Kurdish adults, of whom 45 were women and 40 were 
men. These individuals were currently living in Turkey (Istanbul and 
Diyarbakir), Germany (Berlin) and the UK (London). Research participants 
included political and women’s rights activists, MPs, co-mayors, academics, 
journalists, lawyers, Turkish-Kurdish peace activists and community 
representatives.  
This builds on work I have conducted on Kurdish diaspora organisation and 
practices in the UK, Germany and Turkey since 2008, as part of my previous 
research (Tas 2013a, 2013b and 2014a). In addition, reports from different 
NGOs, brochures and publications from different Kurdish associations were 
examined; events, seminars and conferences were followed; and speeches 
and interviews from different Kurdish and Turkish political and military 
leaders were analysed. 
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The arguments of the article 
This article focuses on three interconnected arguments. First, it analyses both 
the ongoing conflict and also the so-called ‘peace process’ between the 
Turkish state and Kurds, especially the PKK and their imprisoned leader 
Abdullah Ocalan. I want to begin by arguing that there is no real peace 
process in Turkey. The outcomes of the research reported here show that the 
aim of negotiations – for both the ruling Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) and the PKK – is actually to monopolise power and violence, rather 
than to move towards peace. The second argument presented here is that 
diaspora, especially for stateless people, do not only occur when people move 
to ‘a home away from home’. Forced migration, unequal citizenship and an 
unsafe living environment means that even an ancestral homeland can feel 
like a diaspora. Even though they do not have any state to their name, 
Kurdish diasporas – both in Turkey and outside – have become increasingly 
active agents. They are not only idealistic protesters, but can also act as 
positive agents for the homeland. The links that Kurds in the diasporas have 
with the international community have effects not only on the conflict, but 
also on potential ‘peace-making’, ‘peacebuilding’ and ‘reconciliation’ 
processes within Turkey. The article therefore challenges Benedict 
Anderson’s idea that those who live in diaspora keep themselves safe and 
avoid personal sacrifices (Anderson 1998). Instead, it is suggested that 
diaspora can be an active part of both peace and conflict. Thirdly, the article 
contends that the ‘game’-based so-called ‘peace process’ has further 
deepened divisions between Turks and Kurds, and opened the door for an 
escalation of violent conflict.  It is argued that, if there is no sustainable peace 
between Turks and Kurds, there is a strong possibility that the Turkish state 
could break down, in a similar way to Yugoslavia, Iraq and Syria. Kurds have 
already established some de facto state institutions in Turkey and in diasporas. 
A case-study of alternative Kurdish legal practice reported here gives an 
example of how one of these de facto institutions works. Finally and most 
importantly, the article suggests 15 practical steps towards a sustainable 
peace. 
The reasons for the recent conflict 
The first sign of the failure of the most recent so-called ‘peace process’ was 
seen in almost all Kurdish-populated cities in Turkey on 6-7 October 2014. 
Around 50 people lost their lives while protesting Turkey state support for 
the Islamic State’s (ISIS) siege of Kobani, a Kurdish town in northern Syria. 
Syrian Kurds and their main Democratic Union Party (PYD) would not have 
been able to defend Kobani without support from other Kurds, especially 
Northern (Turkey) and Southern (Iraq) Kurds. The PYD and the PKK are 
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sister parties and support each other. Both have fought for autonomy within 
Syria and Turkey, respectively (Akbaba 2014; Daglar 2014; Pope 2014). The 
Turkish government was hoping that the Kurds in Kobane would fail. This 
could weaken Kurds and leave them with no option but to follow Turkey’s 
wishes. It is important to stress that both the PKK and the PYD have claimed 
that they have moved away from earlier calls for an independent Kurdistan, 
and now are asking for autonomy within existing nation states.  
In the June 2015 election in Turkey, the People’s Democratic Party – HDP (a 
Kurdish-led party with wider appeal, including among progressive Turks) 
managed to pass the 10 per cent parliamentary threshold. This gave them 
Parliamentary power, at least theoretically, thereby threatening both the 
mono-identity of the Turkish state and also mono-power and exclusive 
politics of the PKK. Even more than this, it also fundamentally challenged the 
hegemonic power that the AKP has exercised over more than a decade. The 
established Turkish state bureaucracy and the AKP have therefore come 
together, not only to fight against PKK, but also almost against the very 
existence of Kurds in Turkey and Syria.  
Kurdish military victories in Syria and Iraq against ISIS and HDP’s electoral 
victory in Turkey against the Erdogan-led regime, have increased the state’s 
historical fears of a possible of creation of Kurdish state and division of 
Turkey. Any so-called peace process has now been shelved. The Turkish 
government instead focused first on destroying the embryonic Kurdish state 
in Syria; second on criminalising and destroying the legal Kurdish political 
movements (including HDP) in Turkey; and third on blocking the 
development of Iraqi Kurdistan into an independent state. For all these 
reasons, any so-called peace related developments that happened after 
October 2014 – when any peace process ended, and conflict escalated – were 
just theatre played out by both the Turkish state and Kurdish political 
representatives. This theatre in the name of peace includes the work of the so 
called ‘Wise People’s Committee’3 and the Dolmabahce Declaration4.  
                                                 
3 The ‘Wise People’s Committee’ was created on 3 April 2013. There were a total of 63 members of this 
committee, which aimed to help the development of peace between Turks and Kurds. However, the 
members of this committee were personally selected by then-Prime Minister, now President, Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan. 
4 On 28 February 2015, a joint statement about ‘peace talks’ was issued for the first time by the HDP and 
representatives of the AKP government. This was known as the Dolmabahce Declaration. However, just 
weeks after this declaration, Erdogan showed his anger and disagreement with the declaration, which 
remained part of the ‘theatrical’ actions of the Erdogan-led AKP. According to this agreement, ten 
articles were jointly issued by the AKP and HDP representatives. These included: 1. to make a new, 
pluralistic and inclusive constitution; 2. To open a way for Kurds to be part of democratic, legal politics 
and to remove the current 10 percent threshold; 3. To disarm the PKK; 4. To de-centralise Turkey; 5. To 
develop a new, more inclusive identity for the Turkish state; 6. To create a truth and reconciliation 
committee; 7. To strengthen the rule of law, to respect freedom of speech and free media; 8. To give 
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Since August 2015, several towns in Eastern Turkey (North Kurdistan), have 
been under 24-hour curfew for months (Amnesty International 2016a and 
2016b; Pitel 2016a). This means that civilians either starve or face sniper fire. 
The UK Green Party (2016) Leader Natalie Bennett described the situation:  
Kurdish communities in eastern Turkey have been placed under so-called curfews, 
some for long periods, which has made it impossible for families to secure food 
supplies, threatened their access to water and electricity and denied those in need 
access to medical treatment. Amnesty International has described this as being like 
‘collective punishment’ of these communities. 
There is not only a lack of any substantive progress towards peace, but also a 
worsening of the situation (BBC 2016a). Conflict has spread all over Turkey. 
The violence is not just between state forces and the PKK militias. There has 
also been an increase in violence against Kurdish people who live or work in 
the western cities of Turkey. Many HDP offices have been targeted and burnt 
by Turkish nationalists and AKP supporters since June 2015. This has led to 
scores of Kurdish deaths.  
In addition to conflict in the Kurdish regions and all over Turkey, between 
June 2015 and March 2016, Turkey has so far witnessed seven suicide 
explosions: five by the Islamic State (ISIS); two by the Kurdistan Freedom 
Falcons (TAK). These have cost more than 300 lives (ICG Report 2016; Karaca 
2016). Conditions in some parts of Erdogan’s Turkey are not very different 
than those in Syria under Bashar Al-Assad. If all these attacks were not the 
result of Turkish state intelligence collaboration, then they were a total 
intelligence failure of the Turkish state to let these almost identical attacks 
happen (Letsch 2016a).  
Erdogan has used ISIS attacks, which have mainly killed Kurds, as an excuse 
to start a war, not against Islamic militants, but instead against Kurds in 
Turkey and Syria (CBC 2016; RT 2016; Tisdall 2016). Instead of retaliating 
against ISIS militants, Turkey and President Erdogan are once again 
repeating the unsuccessful military methods used in the last hundred years, 
in yet another attempt to ‘annihilate’ the Kurdish militants and their 
supporters (Cakan 2015).  
Making Kurds the scapegoat is always popular among Turkish nationalists 
and populist politicians who court the nationalist vote. Scapegoating Kurds 
allows the state to divert attention away from the country’s other major social 
and economic problems. While Erdogan tries to use this card, the PKK also 
uses Erdogan’s anti-Kurdish policies to increase Kurdish nationalism for its 
                                                 
amnesty for political prisoners; 9. To remove social and economic inequalities between different parts of 
Turkey; 10. To improve gender equality and ecological damage. 
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own hegemony. Within both Turkish and Kurdish societies it has almost 
become a crime to be anti-nationalist. These developments support the idea 
that, for both the Erdogan-led AKP government and the PKK, the so-called 
negotiations were not about risk-taking to make peace – but about risk-
avoidance to maintain the status quo, and so to maintain the current actors’ 
grasp on power. However, without taking substantial risks, including the risk 
of losing power, it is effectively impossible to broker peace (Dogan 2016). 
Since August 2014, when Erdogan became president, 1,845 court cases have 
been brought against human rights activists, lawyers, journalists, academics , 
politicians and even ordinary citizens by Erdogan’s lawyers (The Guardian 
2016b). He expanded the definition of terrorism and to include almost 
everybody who is against his authoritarian policies. He said on 5th April 
2016: “[those] who pose as academics, spies who identify themselves as 
journalists, an activist disguised as a politician . . . [they] are no different from 
the terrorists who throw bombs” (Zalewski 2016). Nobody’s life is safe, 
especially Kurdish rights supporters and lawyers. For example, Tahir Elci, a 
well known human rights lawyer, was killed while he was conducting a press 
meeting in Diyarbakir, in November 2015. Tens of Kurdish lawyers have been 
detained (Geerdink 2016). For the Erdogan-led regime almost every criticism 
can be regarded as a treasonable insult to the Turkish state. This has also been 
the case for Kurdish (HDP) MPs. Foreign academics and journalists have been 
deported or their working conditions made difficult for merely criticising 
Erdogan. For example, a British academic, Christopher Stephenson, who is 
married to a Turkish woman and has lived in Turkey for 17 years, was caught 
up in the witch-hunt against the academics' peace petition. When he showed 
solidarity with three of the academics in pre-trial detention, he was arrested 
for carrying leaflets advertising a Kurdish New Year event. He was detained 
and then deported from Turkey (Pitel 2016b). Only after pressure from the 
British Embassy was he able to return to Turkey. 
Before analysing the current conditions in the Middle East and Turkey, and 
the role of diaspora communities in more depth, I would like to underline 
that peace negotiations are never easy. Getting started is often – usually – the 
most difficult thing to do (Tas 2015). Conflict will either be temporarily and 
conditionally stopped, or may even be continuing (Sumbeiywo 2008). Every 
peace process is like a piece of theatre. There are many players, actors – from 
different sides – who do not trust each other. Of course, the different sides 
have different agendas. Some protagonists may be benefiting directly from 
the war, and can easily choose to destroy any possible peace process. For 
example, the fifty thousand men currently employed by the Turkish state as 
village guards have no incentive to support peace, since peace will probably 
mean that they will lose their family’s livelihood. Losing their job would also 
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mean losing the weapon they rely on to ‘defend’ themselves (Geerdink 2014). 
Other people may want to be perceived as peacemakers, but only so that they 
can monopolise power and violence for their own benefit. It is even more 
difficult when there has been a long war, with trust lost between parties and 
societies. This is the Turkish, Kurdish and Middle Eastern situation. 
The homeland is a diaspora for stateless people 
It would be inappropriate to write about conflict and peace without 
considering the role of diasporas. In this article, I am using the world 
‘diaspora’ to mean both a place and group of people. I have already discussed 
elsewhere (Tas 2014a, 2016) that for stateless people, diaspora is not just the 
‘home away from the original homeland’ or ‘dispersal of people from their 
original homeland’ described by many researchers (see Connor 1986; Safran 
1991; Van Hear 1998; Tölölyan 1996; Cohen 1997; Palmer 1998). Forced 
internal migration can create diaspora within a nation-state. Continuing state 
oppression, weak citizenship, differential minority classification and 
treatment (Ustundag 2016), and an unsafe living environment all mean that 
even the ancestral homeland can feel like a diaspora. For that reason stateless 
Kurds do not just have one diaspora, they have double or even triple 
diasporas (Tas 2016). For example, a Kurdish family from Diyarbakir, in 
eastern Turkey, may feel as though they are living in a diaspora. When they 
are forced to move to Istanbul, they are living in a double diaspora. After they 
migrate to London or Berlin, they are in a triple diaspora. All places feel 
temporary for them. 
‘Diaspora’ has become an over-used term to refer to almost all migrants, 
overseas communities, or even travellers who have moved temporarily and 
voluntarily from their original home. The term ‘diaspora’ is also used to 
describe a place away from a community’s actual homeland (see Connor 
1986; Safran 1991; Van Hear 1998; Tölölyan 1996; Cohen 1997; Palmer 1998). 
These two definitions of diaspora have made the term lose its actual meaning. 
For this reason, we should not talk about Turkish, Chinese, German or Indian 
diasporas in the same way as we would a dispersed, persecuted diaspora 
groups such as Kurds, Palestinians, Tamils or Roma. The first group of people 
have an actual homeland and may return voluntarily at any time they want. 
However the concept of diaspora is different for stateless people, who live a 
life of exile wherever they are. Their actual homeland may be occupied 
militarily and ruled by a harsh regime, and their culture, language, traditions 
and religion may be banned or otherwise restricted. These diasporas are 
unable to feel safe and live mostly in exile conditions. Many of my Kurdish 
interviewees describe living in Turkey, and even in the Kurdish regions, as 
akin to living in exile, even more than it would be in Berlin or London. Those 
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that have experienced forced migration and dispersal are unable to return to 
their homeland, and may also not feel safe even if they live in their imagined 
homeland. There is no safe homeland for them. This means a homeland can 
be considered one of the biggest diasporas for stateless people. A Kurdish 
lawyer from Dersim (a Kurdish and Alevi majority city in Turkey), living in 
Istanbul told me in November 2015: 
Even as a lawyer myself, I am afraid for my life every day in this country because I 
am Kurdish and an Alevi. Taking on the cases of fellow Kurds persecuted by the State 
creates a huge threat to me, not only from the State itself but also from my Turkish 
colleagues. Living and working here is like exile. I am not equal to other Turks. Every 
day I feel like a second-class citizen, even though I graduated from one of the best 
law faculties - Ankara University. This is the gurbet [diaspora] within which we have 
been born.  
A Kurdish student from a London university also explained: 
The Turkish state does not want us to exist anywhere. Everywhere, including our 
homeland, even Diyarbakir, has been turned into a diaspora for us. I live in the UK 
and at least we are allowed to say what we want, despite the fact that the Turkish 
Embassy and government put pressure on the British authorities to arrest us 
sometimes when we protest peacefully against Turkish state aggressions against our 
people… But look at Turkey and Syria, they don’t even arrest people, they kill them 
directly and want Kurds as an ethnic and cultural group to decline, to be wiped out 
completely. Our Kurdish lands and cities in Turkey are the worst diaspora among 
them all. 
The lack of control in their homeland and weak connections to any real place 
affect the daily life, culture and identity of many stateless people. This 
constitutes a strong barrier to the idea of living together peacefully and 
equally with the hegemonic majority. The conflict and separation begins 
when one community ignores all other different identities and imposes its 
own identity and culture on other groups. There is a link between identity 
politics in Turkey, in terms of casting the Kurd as a terrorist and thus as a 
threat to national security, which seems to result in the ongoing 
marginalization.  
Around four million Kurds have already been internally displaced in Turkey, 
and more than one million Kurds from Turkey have moved to Western 
Europe. Even more are, and will be, affected by the ongoing conflict in Turkey 
and the Middle East. The Western world, especially European countries, has 
turned a blind eye to oppressive and totalitarian leaders such as Erdogan in 
the hope that they will not receive any further refugees and can assimilate 
those they already have. As long as Erdogan continues to make empty 
promises, many European countries will continue to crack down on the PKK 
or Kurds more generally and their activities. European silence about 
authoritarian regimes is not new. They were silent about Saddam Hussein, 
Peace Making or State Breaking, Tas 
 
34 
 
when he used chemical weapons against Iraqi Kurds. Only when Saddam 
occupied Kuwait, did the West take any action. However, it is the 
discriminatory policies of these oppressive leaders that have created the 
forced migrations in the Middle East and Turkey in the first place. As long as 
war, conflict and crime continue as a result of their identity and national 
policies, the tidal wave of more refugees will continue to flow. A recent study 
by Bosphorus University in Istanbul showed that more than 30 percent of 
people from Turkey, around 25 million, would like to leave the country 
because of ongoing political instability (Cumhuriyet 2016).  
The history of the Turkish-Kurdish ‘peace processes’ 
In the last 35 years there has never been a day without war and violence in 
the Middle East and Turkey. The most recent conflict – which started in 
March 2011 in Syria and has included Iraq from 2014 and Turkey from June 
2015 – has cost around five hundred thousand lives. It has created more than 
11 million homeless refugees (BBC 2016b). It is not surprising that all of these 
wars have disproportionately affected Kurds in terms of displacement and 
genocides. Kurdish statelessness is a key reason for the direct and indirect 
discrimination against Kurds in the various nation states that they live in.  
In Syria and Iraq, there is currently no rule of law, no consistent authority 
and, effectively, no state. The Iranian and Turkish states have their own 
agendas. They are both aiming for a ‘big brother’ style leadership of the 
Middle East using Shia or Sunni proxies respectively (Tas 2015). Neither Iran 
nor Turkey wants to see Kurds united, as since the sixteenth century both are 
accustomed to using warring Kurdish factions as buffer armies. When Kurds 
try to move away from this situation, and connect with the international 
community as we have seen in the recent cases, then the Iranian and Turkish 
states try new ways to weaken Kurds and keep them divided (Tas 2014a and 
2014b). Most recently, at the same time that Turkey was supporting the ISIS 
against Kurds in the Middle East (Sanchez 2016) and using state violence 
against Kurds in Turkey, Iran was directly helping and supporting Shia 
militias fighting in Iraq against both Kurds and ISIS. Both countries are happy 
to see Kurds divided. There is a famous phrase that says, “if you find two 
brothers fighting, do not try to separate them, otherwise they will both turn 
on you” (Sumbeiywo 2008). In the Kurdish case, other countries do not just 
leave Kurdish factions to fight each other; they add fuel to the flames to make 
sure that the fighting continues. 
All these issues and ‘big brother’ games demonstrate why it is difficult to talk 
about any real peace process between Turks and Kurds. There have been 
some talks about possible peace-talks. These limited talks have not involved 
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all the different internal and international stakeholders. Instead, they have 
only been between two political parties or groups (AKP for Turkey, and PKK 
for Kurds).  
These talks about talks are not new. Around two decades ago, in 1993, the 
Turkish President Ozal tried to negotiate with the PKK leader Ocalan through 
various mediators (Ensaroglu 2013; Tas 2015). At around the same time, 
conservative Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel, during a visit to Diyarbakir, 
said that Turkey “recognised the Kurdish reality.” Following these positive 
moves, on 20 March 1993, just a day before the Newroz (Kurdish New Year) 
celebrations, the PKK declared their first - and not their last - ceasefire.  
However these positive movements did not bear fruit and the one sided PKK 
ceasefire ended in June 1993 after a group of PKK militias killed 33 soldiers 
who had finished their compulsory military service and who were on their 
way to their home. This failure opened the door for the brutal conflicts of the 
1990s. The importance of the ‘Kurdish question’ was acknowledged in 1995 
once again when a progressive Turkish politician, the ex-Prime Minister 
Mesut Yilmaz, declared that democratisation in Turkey and EU accession 
could not be achieved in Ankara until the problems in Diyarbakir were 
resolved. In 1997, Turkish Prime Minister Erbakan made another 
unsuccessful attempt – one of the results of which was a military coup.   
The ‘Kurdish question’ moved beyond Turkey to become a European and 
international issue with the capture of the PKK founder and leader, Abdullah 
Ocalan, in 1999. After this arrest the PKK and many Kurdish leaders were 
initially paralysed. Until 2004, the PKK were effectively militarily silent. 
However, this was socially, politically and legally one of the most active times 
for Kurds and the PKK. According to many of my interviewees in Turkey, 
Berlin and London, Kurds and the PKK started to learn about the dynamics 
of international power, and focus on international politics.  
The PKK recruited a new cadre of members and reorganised the approach to 
armed struggle against Turkey. Perhaps even more importantly, the PKK 
focused on creating social, legal and economic institutions in Turkey, Syria, 
Iraq and the different diasporas. These institutions were intended to 
contribute to a possible future Kurdish state, as discussed in a later legal case-
study. Transnational Kurdish mobilisation was created and links were made 
between different capitals, including Diyarbakir, Istanbul, Berlin, Brussels, 
London and Paris. Different political parties, associations and unofficial legal 
courts were created and developed during this militarily silent, but 
institutionally very active, period. Although the PKK was listed, and so 
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banned, as a terrorist organisation by many states5, political, social and 
economic mobilisation continued.  
During the same time period, with Ocalan under arrest and the PKK 
militarily quiet, Turkey felt able to relax militarily. However, the effect of the 
long war with Kurds had paralysed Turkey socially and economically. 
Seeking help from the economic crisis, the focus was on achieving EU 
accession. Turkey promised to meet the Copenhagen Criteria, and in 
response, Turkey’s candidacy was approved in Helsinki in December 1999. 
Some important constitutional amendments were passed by the Turkish 
parliament following Ocalan’s arrest, including the abolition of the death 
penalty and of the state of emergency (Tezcur 2010). All of this was, however, 
before the AKP came to power. 
On 3 November 2002, after a decade of coalition government, the AKP 
achieved an electoral majority and was elected under the leadership of Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan. Despite the moves towards democratisation, there were no 
specific constitutional changes recognising the existence of Kurdish ethnicity 
or language. No positive rights were – or are – accorded to Kurds. Instead, 
thousands of Kurds remain in prison. Deaths in custody, extrajudicial 
killings, forced migration, and unequal societal treatment all impact Kurds 
disproportionately. Ryan (1994) and Wickham-Crowley (1992 and 1994) 
claim that democratisation can reduce the capacity and organisation of 
insurgent movement. This is not so if the so-called improvements are short-
term and cosmetic, as is the case for Kurds in Turkey. As long as the 
underlying reasons for starting rebel movements continue, mobilisation and 
further radicalisation of those movements also continues. Turkey has 
historically followed one step forward, two steps back when it comes to the 
Kurdish issue. This has increased the conflict year by year. Kurds are forced 
to live in diaspora conditions with unequal citizenship. Kurdish regions have 
not been supported with economic development and unemployment still 
remains very high. Silence from the PKK allowed the Turkish state and 
government to continue to ‘wait and see’ and apply the old methods of 
ignorance and assimilation, under the guise of a process of so-called 
democratisation. Only after the PKK restarted the war on the Turkish state in 
2004, did the AKP remember that it had a ‘Kurdish problem.’ In August 2005, 
Prime Minister Erdogan claimed that ‘the Kurdish problem’ is his problem 
and that he would resolve it through democracy (Yavuz 2009). But very little 
in the way of resolution was done in the following four years.  
                                                 
5 The European Union first listed the PKK as having ‘been involved in terrorist acts’ in 2002. It reaffirmed 
its position in 2011. Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2011:028:TOC [accessed 04.01.2015]. 
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In 2009, the AKP opened a public debate about a ‘Kurdish opening’. After 
criticism from Turkish nationalists, including AKP members, this was 
renamed as a ‘democratic opening’. Even this title was too radical for 
nationalist Turks, and the initiative was rebranded as ‘the national unity and 
fraternity project.’ Even though the Erdogan-led AKP had a dominant 
majority, it was difficult to even decide on a name for negotiations. However, 
Kurds and some Turks were still hopeful for peace. 
Eventually, in late 2008 and the beginning of 2009, with the help of Norway 
and the United Kingdom, and for the first time in history, Turkish state 
representatives and the PKK, working alongside members of the Kurdish 
diaspora in Europe, had direct meetings and peace talks in Oslo. This is now 
called the Oslo Process. As in many other examples, including in Northern 
Ireland and South Africa, this process for preparation for peace was carried 
out secretly. According to many of my interviewees, there was even a signed 
declaration between Turkish state representative and the PKK about the 
peace process. However, this peace attempt could not be sustained. The 
Turkish government and the PKK each blamed the other for the collapse of 
the talks in 2011, after the minutes were leaked to the media, and the process 
was made public (Philips 2015). The broken promises and loss of hope after 
Oslo were followed again by some of the bloodiest conflicts between Turkish 
state forces and the PKK since before the 1999 Abdullah Ocalan arrest (Tezcur 
2013). The Uludere massacre took place in December 2011, when 34 Kurdish 
civilians were killed by the Turkish air force (Economist 2012; Al-Monitor 
2013; Goel 2015). This escalated the conflict. Following this, Ocalan’s 
meetings with his lawyers and other visitors were cancelled. PKK prisoners 
in Turkey took part in lengthy hunger strikes at the end of 2012.  
During this crisis I carried out fieldwork research in Germany. This included 
meeting and talking with Sakine Cansiz in Berlin, in December 2012. Cansiz 
was one of the founding members of the PKK and a prominent leader within 
the Kurdish women’s movement. We discussed the conflict and the poor 
prospects for peace, just a few weeks before she and other two female Kurdish 
political activists were assassinated in Paris (9 January 2013). The murderer’s 
links with the Turkish Intelligence Service (MIT) have been confirmed 
(Cumhuriyet 2015; Demir 2015). This tragic murder shows that Kurds are not 
just facing uncertainty and violence in their homeland, but they are also not 
safe in the diasporas, including in Western Europe. 
Despite the bloody war, 67 days of hunger strike and the Paris assassinations, 
there was another step towards peace when Ocalan’s ceasefire message was 
read during the Newroz 2013 celebrations in Diyarbakir. The PKK and Ocalan 
openly declared that ‘peace process’ negotiations were going on. This time 
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the process was named the ‘Imrali process’, after the island where the 
imprisoned PKK leader, Ocalan, has been jailed since 1999. However, the 
Erdogan-led AKP government claimed for a long time that it was not the 
government but the state that was in contact with Ocalan and other Kurdish 
political representatives. This was an attempt to protect the AKP from any 
damage resulting from this process. They were avoiding the real issue, rather 
than taking any risks. As Candar (2015) states, the peace process in Turkey 
between Turks and Kurds was neither transparent nor mediated by a third 
party. The AKP government attempted to assert its strength by neglecting to 
include any independent parties, and this damaged the process’ structural 
viability. Candar (2015) is clear that the “Kurdish issue has become an 
electioneering tactic on the part of the AKP and therefore any current peace 
process efforts would be lacking in substance and drive”. 
Unbalanced ‘peace processes’ 
In 2009, the Turkish President Abdullah Gul acknowledged that the Kurdish 
issue was Turkey’s most important problem. He claimed that “Good things 
are going to happen” (Turkone 2009; Lindenstrauss 2016). However, seven 
years after the 2009 Oslo talks and after 15 years of an AKP government there 
have still not been any substantive developments. Despite the talks between 
Ocalan and some key players, including some Kurdish MPs, the Turkish 
Intelligence Service and some AKP members, no ‘good things’ have 
happened. The current Turkish President Erdogan has been the unchallenged 
leader of both AKP and Turkey since 2002. He has consistently avoided, at 
least openly, either being part of the peace process or even working to move 
this process on. But even the basic right to use the Kurdish language is not 
yet legal. The Turkish constitution has not been changed to allow Kurds to 
use their language or have education in the Kurdish language (Tas 2014a; 
Aslan 2015). Abdullah Demirbas, the former Sur Mayor (Sur is a district in 
Diyarbakir) explained that staff in Kurdish municipalities, including elected 
Mayors like himself, have been prosecuted for speaking Kurdish. At the same 
time the AKP was promoting ‘Kurdish Language’ initiatives such as a state-
run Kurdish TV channel, TRT6 (now TRT Kurdi), even those are still illegal 
under the constitution (Demirbas 2010). Ironically, the State is allowed to use 
Kurdish for its own political and assimilative aim, but Kurdish people and 
politicians are not allowed to use their own language. 
Erdogan’s primary agenda has been to promote his personal power, and 
restrict any challenges to it. This is why he was so keen to change Turkey 
from a parliamentary system to a presidency. This has always come before 
making peace. However, after Selahattin Demirtas, the co-leader of the pro-
Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party, the HDP, declared in March 2015 that 
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“we will not make you the president” (Hurriyet 2015), then Erdogan focused 
on playing the Turkish nationalist card. In April 2015, in direct contradiction 
of his 2005 Diyarbakir speech, he claimed that, “Turkey has no Kurdish 
problem”. He has repeated this claim several times since 2015. The following 
months, he restarted the war against Kurds in Turkey and started a Syrian 
offensive.  
When a peace process only involves a few of the parties to the conflict, and 
leaders are only concerned with their self-interest, it is not surprising that the 
results are as observed in the Turkish-Kurdish peace process. If peace 
negotiations are to be successful, and not rely solely on military action, the 
different parties must work together and be prepared to take risks to solve 
the dispute. Without a clear roadmap, a specified timetable, the involvement 
of all key stakeholders and interested third parties, plus international 
involvement, it is not possible to even start to resolve the differences between 
sides who have been in conflict for a long time. Neither key actors within 
different civil entities, nor all the various relevant political parties knew the 
details of negotiations between the imprisoned Kurdish leader and the AKP 
or state representatives. There was no clarity about the peace talks 
themselves, the possible reconciliation process, or possible new institutions 
in the formation of a potentially decentralised Turkish state. As we have seen 
in the Turkish-Kurdish case, empty promises in relation to this sort of so-
called ‘peace process’ almost always open the door for brutal conflict. This is 
exactly what led to the conflict that started in June 2015.  
Even if a peace process was successfully developing between the PKK and 
AKP then, in the long term, the exclusion of the other factions might well 
increase the possibilities of conflict. For example, Kurdish Hezbollah could 
turn their guns onto the Turkish state, saying that they do not recognise any 
peace process, and that they want to fight for an independent Kurdish or 
Islamic State. Similarly, Turkish nationalists (MHP, National Front Party), 
some Turkish leftish (including some members of the CHP, Republican 
People’s Party) and former members of the Turkish military have not 
supported any moves towards peace processes with Kurds, including the 
most recent one. Instead, they have been championing more oppressive types 
of military operation in Kurdish regions (Yavuz and Ozcan 2007; Gocek 2011) 
All previous negotiations were unbalanced. On one side of the imagined 
‘peace process’ was the government of the Turkish state, on the other, an 
imprisoned leader under the control of that government and the state. 
Messages from Ocalan about the negotiations were delivered by a few 
selected Kurdish political party members. Research about peace and conflict 
suggests that, at the beginning, any peace process should be limited to only a 
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few actors.6 But in the Kurdish and Turkish context there has been no 
substantive process over the last seven years. After all this time, we still do 
not even know whether there are any mutually agreed principles, and what 
they might be. There has not been an Observatory Committee. No Truth and 
Reconciliation Committee has been established until the day this research 
was completed. There has been no involvement from the UN or the European 
Union, or any other parts of the international community. Nor is it clear who 
might be the guarantor of any potential peace. Millions of people have 
suffered and have been forced to move to internal and external diasporas, as 
discussed above, because of the ongoing conflict.  
Understandably, both the migrants and those people who have not moved 
have very little trust in the ongoing so-called peace process. All this makes 
both any talks and the overall peace process itself very fragile. The politics of 
the Middle East are extremely dynamic. Individual players and factions 
frequently swap allegiances (Rosenberg and Wolfsfeld 1977). It is therefore 
important that any peace process should include all main actors and factions 
(Laderach1997; Zartman 2007; Ramsbotham et al. 2011). 
Kurds and Turks can only continue living together if there is a peaceful 
solution to the ongoing conflict. Even hope for peace cannot continue if 
promises keep being empty. Each new episode of violence acts as a reminder 
of the previous bad experiences and further increases hate between the 
different ethnic groups, making it more difficult for future generations to 
come together and make a durable peace. The recent wars with Kurds in Syria 
and Turkey will produce new developments, and may even challenge 
borders in the Middle East, including Turkey. Kurds have moved on from 
their old method of armed struggle against Turkey into societal resistance. 
They have named Turkey as a ‘coloniser’ or ‘occupier’ state. With the help of 
the transnational Kurdish diaspora, they have made the Kurdish issue into 
an international issue and so brought the Kurdish case to a similar level as 
the Israeli and Palestinian conflict, as discussed in more detail by Darweish 
and Rigby (2015). 
Diaspora and peace processes 
The underlying concern here is how to work towards successful negotiations 
for peace, including a stable post-conflict situation, with the help of Kurdish 
stateless diasporas. There is a large body of literature on diaspora, conflict 
and peace (see for example, Lederach 1997; Al-Ali 2007; Snyder 2015). One 
can easily observe deep differences between and within diasporic 
                                                 
6 See for example: Rosenberg and Wolfsfeld 1977; Laderach1997; Wessels 1998; Zartman 2007; Harbom 
and Wallensteen 2008; Bercovitch 2009; Loizides 2009; Ramsbotham et al. 2011; Hamber 2015. 
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communities. As in the Kurdish homelands, diaspora societies are not a 
unitary or homogenous entity. Religious and ideological divisions exist 
within Kurdish society. However they have also common political, cultural, 
geographical aims and wishes. 
War and conflict over the past thirty years have forced hundreds of 
thousands of stateless Kurds to flee their homelands in Turkey and other 
countries in the Middle East in an attempt to secure safety outside of the 
region. Many of those who have moved to Western Europe experience 
continued feelings of alienation, with only limited feelings of belonging to 
their ‘host countries’, and a frequent sense of living in limbo. These 
sentiments have been an important engine of Kurdish nationalism, 
mobilising Kurdish men and women in the diaspora to bring an end to their 
perceived statelessness (Tas 2015 and 2016). The diaspora is seen by many as 
a safe environment within which to organise: creating not only ‘long-distance 
nationalists’ (Anderson 1998 and 2006; Sheffer 2002; Schiller et al. 2001; 
Schiller 2005) but also alternative institutions for a future, imagined state. It 
can be argued that statelessness, diaspora and nationalism are strongly 
connected in so far as statelessness and diaspora can be seen to feed 
nationalism. Since Kurds have no ‘unitary’ religious or linguistic identity, 
many Kurds have claimed that the only way forward is to become much more 
nationalistic. From this perspective, unity through nationalism is the only 
way to end Kurdish statelessness and to make a stable peace.  
Many Kurds believe that Kurdish people, both as individuals and as a 
community, have not been ‘strong enough’ nationalists, since they have not 
been successful at establishing their own state. The weak nationalism of 
stateless people, including Kurds, has been part of academic debate in recent 
years. For example, Ismail Besikci, a well-known Turkish academic who has 
researched Kurdish issues for decades, has asserted that, “Kurds are not good 
enough nationalists. They should not be as democratic as they are today. It’s 
too much. It is not Kurds’ business to make Turkey a more democratic 
country” (Besikci 2014; Hamsici (2014).  
Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned leader of the PKK, has also called on all 
Kurdish people around the world to unite, and to show resistance against 
their enemies (Letsch 2014). Kurds who have left the various imagined 
homelands of Kurdistan to live in diasporas, often take such calls for national 
solidarity especially seriously. The ISIS attack on Kobane (Rojova, North 
Syria), which has cost thousands of lives and caused suffering to hundreds of 
thousands of people, is the first time in history that Kurds from different parts 
of the world have joined together to fight for the same cause. These efforts 
demonstrate a significant shift in Kurdish nationalism: from localised and 
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weak nationalism towards a collective, stronger form of nationalism with the 
help of diaspora mobilisation. 
However, some other Kurds argue against stronger nationalism, and instead 
believe that Kurds need to be more democratic than they are currently. Abbas 
Vali, another well-known Kurdish academic, said: “I have to fundamentally 
disagree with Besikci. Kurds are not democratic enough” (Vali 2015). Kurds 
who want to promote a more advanced form of democracy are especially 
concerned about the rights of women and other powerless groups. They even 
want to champion the right to be heard for those people who hold political 
views in direct opposition to their own.   
Because of long years under the assimilationist policies of the Turkish state, 
then until recently many Kurds have felt ashamed of their cultural identity. 
Many Kurds hid their Kurdishness and Kurdish roots (Tas 2014a). However, 
with the recent conflict in the Middle East and, especially, the victorious 
fighting in Kobane, more Kurds are now becoming increasingly proud of 
their Kurdishness.  Linked to this, there is increasing Kurdish nationalism. As 
Kurds are still an underdog minority, this nationalism is developing into an 
‘aggressive’ form which has been described by Bozarlan (2015) as ‘narcissistic 
nationalism’7.  
Members of the Kurdish diaspora have for many years tried to remove the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)8 from the European Union’s list of 
designated terrorist groups (Channel Four News 2014). Freedom for Ocalan 
is another key goal of the Kurdish national diaspora movement. These 
movements are organised under the banner of the Kurdish National 
Congress in diasporas (KNC – Kongreya Neteweyî ya Kurdistanê). This was 
established on 24 May 1999, just a few months after Ocalan was arrested. 
Underlining the importance of the diaspora communities, the KNC is based 
in Brussels. This is a temporary arrangement which will last until Kurds have 
full independence, or at least, substantive autonomy.  
Under the KNC banner, Kurdish transnational political and protest 
movements in Europe have made the world aware of the effects of ISIS 
attacks against Kurds in Shengal, Iraq and Kobane, Syria as well as Turkish 
state violence against Kurds in Turkey. I believe that Benedict Anderson 
(1998) is wrong when he claims that members of diaspora communities try to 
                                                 
7 The term was used first time by Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) appeared in his work “Civilization and Its 
Discontents (1929-30), in relation to the application of the inborn aggression in man to ethnic (and other) 
conflicts. 
8 The Kurdistan Workers’ Party, Partiya Kărkeran Kurdistan (PKK) in Kurdish, began operations against 
the Turkish State in 1984. Since then more than 50,000 Kurdish and Turkish people have died as a result 
of the conflict. 
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influence what is going on in their homeland without being physically 
involved in destructive conflicts. As part of my ethnographic research, I was 
told that thousands of young Kurdish men and women have travelled from 
London, Berlin or Istanbul to fight, and help the Kurds in Turkey and Syria. 
Some of these people are well-educated or work in well-paid professions. 
Even some of those who remained in their new host countries, or as internal 
migrants within Turkey, have been arrested for demonstrating their support 
for the Kurdish cause. 
People from different diasporas who cannot go to fight themselves, instead 
organise fundraising events and take part in lobbying activities and 
demonstrations with the aim of persuading British and European politicians 
to help the Kurdish movements in Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran. For example, 
in September and October 2014, some London based Kurds even went on 
hunger strike for the Kurdish cause. Between June 2015 and March 2016, 
thousands of Kurds in different diasporas have carried out demonstrations 
and organised petitions against anti-Kurdish state operations by Turkey. 
Some of these Kurds have been criminalised by the British or Turkish state 
(Baser 2015; Garmiany 2015; Telgraf 2016).  
Kurds are no longer just a local tribal group, operating through kinship 
networks. Kurdish lobbying in the diaspora may not be as strong as that for 
Turks, Armenians and Jews, but they are moving in that direction (Barzani 
2014). Millions of Kurds and their supporters can, and do, take to the streets 
of Istanbul, Berlin, London, Paris, New York and Brussels, whenever there is 
an issue of serious concern. They also have increasingly strong and close 
relationships with the governments of their new host countries. For example, 
Kurds regularly use facilities within the UK parliament for meetings and 
political discussions, and several MPs and Lords usually input favourably. 
These increasing links should not be underestimated. 
As we have seen, diaspora communities can easily become a driving engine 
for homeland politics, nationalist movements, and even armed conflict in the 
original homeland. They can also become an agent involved in putative peace 
processes. As discussed above, this was the case for the peace process 
between the PKK and Turkish state representatives, especially the Turkish 
National Intelligence Service. In 2009, initial negotiations were brokered with 
the help of diaspora representatives, in the so-called ‘Oslo Process’ (Tas 2015). 
This example demonstrates that the Kurdish stateless diaspora has already 
been an active, influential actor in policies affecting its homeland. One of my 
interviewees explained in November 2014 (Tas 2016): 
If there is going to be [any] peace [with Turkey], it will be down to the diaspora. And 
that’s true for conflict too. We are becoming as strong as the Armenian and Jewish 
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diaspora. Assimilated Kurds in Turkey cannot make peace – or war – without us. We 
[diaspora Kurds] have suffered. And we [diaspora] will be a part oft he decision-
making pricess, if there are going tob e any decision. 
A Kurdish academic states in February 2016 that without ‘true Kurds’ at the 
peace table, it is not possible to make peace for Kurds. He describes what he 
means by ‘true Kurds’: 
There are many false Kurds in Turkey and elsewhere. They have been assimilated 
under a host identity and can only think about their own personal needs, and the 
importance of their hosts. For example, the Turkish former presidents Ismet Inonu 
and Turgut Ozal, and other politicians who are involved in mainstream Turkish 
political parties, like AKP and CHP, might claim that they are from a Kurdish 
background. But for the whole of their political life, they have worked for the Turkish 
state. These sorts of people cannot and should not represent Kurds. Another group 
of false Kurds are those who try to make small changes to Turkish political structure, 
and so to claim a few minority rights for Kurds. They also don’t represent Kurds. 
Ocalan himself can now be considered as falling into this group, since he has 
sacrificed the aim of Kurdish independence, for a few baubles. But I can forgive him 
because he is in Turkish prison. True Kurds are fighting for full Kurdish 
independence, or at very least, equivalent rights as the Turks have. Only these true 
Kurds deserve a place at the negotiation table. 
This non-negotiable and hyper-nationalist view can be seen among many 
forcibly displaced stateless diasporas. Many people like this have very little 
trust in any so-called ‘peace process’. All of this makes any talks and the peace 
process itself very fragile. Many of my interviewees do not trust the Turkish 
state, especially the Erdogan-led government, to make peace. Another of my 
interviewees explained in London, January 2015:  
Of course we [diaspora Kurds] want peace. Who would not want peace? I have lived 
in three different diasporas in the last 30 years: In Germany, in France and now in the 
UK. I haven’t seen my hometown or my relatives in Turkey since the 1980s. My land 
was occupied by the village guards. Peace may help people like me to end this misery 
and to have their land and their home back. But Turkey is not serious about making 
peace. Erdogan is just playing with us. He needs Kurdish votes and he has used us to 
stay in power since 2002. He has not made any legal changes in favour of Kurds in 
his last 13 years in power. He is not a friend of Kurds. We [Kurds] have to think 
beyond any national borders to help each other. We cannot trust others to help us to 
make peace; we should create our own state and pull down all the borders that divide 
us. 
The imprisoned Kurdish leader, Ocalan, understands the potentially 
important role that diaspora communities have. He has repeatedly asked the 
diaspora to contribute to the development of the peace process both by 
organising discussions and other events, and also to involve European 
institutions and governments in these events. With this in mind, several 
conferences (May and December 2013, December 2014) were organised in 
Brussels by the KNC.  
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At the 13th General Meeting of the KNC, held in Brussels on 25-26 May 2013, 
it was stated that Kurds have the right to live and create their own destiny in 
their own land as a Kurdish nation, and:  
Democratisation of [the] Middle East can be achieved through the recognition of 
Kurdish identity and Kurdistan as a nation… On these grounds Kirkuk and other 
parts of [the] Kurdish region[s] that were taken [by Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran] have 
to be included again in the map of Kurdistan, and these countries have to show their 
respect for the map of Kurdistan and its territory.  
As we see from this explanation, there are no signs that Kurds, as represented 
by the PKK and KNC, have dropped their claim of creating a unitary Kurdish 
state. International law on self-determination also support such view (Thurer 
and Burri 2008). The Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has also 
pointed out in many speeches how various Kurdish power-holders, and 
especially diasporas, play a crucial role in the ongoing conflict and its 
resolution. The Kurdish diaspora is therefore recognised as an important 
influencing factor by both sides of the conflict.  
Kurds are at last learning to play the system 
More tactically, and perhaps more realistically, many Kurdish nationalists 
have temporarily postponed their aim to create a Kurdish state in Turkey, as 
they focus on state-making in Syria and Iraq. One Kurdish legal practitioner 
in Istanbul, who also functions as a Kurdish politician, said in November 
2015: 
Ironically, Kurds have to be thankful to Erdogan and the Turkish state’s recent ill-
considered internal and foreign policies against Kurds. These have shown the 
authoritarian face of Turkey to the world and the real extent of discrimination. This 
[might seem paradoxical, but it] has helped Kurds to increase their power. They now 
control a large area in Syria, and even control some cities in Turkey. Kurds are 
strengthening connections with various international powers and getting increasing 
Western support. So I want to see Erdogan in power a little longer. His aggressive 
policies may actually help Kurds to establish the independent state we have been 
dreaming for such a long time. 
As long as the fight continues in Iraq, Syria and Turkey, the most radical 
Kurds can consolidate their increasingly radical members around that 
struggle. As Jok says for the South Sudanese case: “nations don’t just happen 
– they have to be planned, forged and crafted” (Jok 2012). Many Kurds are 
aware that the processes and techniques for state making are not easy and 
may take a long time. For example, the Mayor of Kobani acknowledged that, 
“we [Kurds] are not professional [yet] when it comes to independence” (Abdi 
2015). Cemil Bayık, one of the founders and leaders of the outlawed PKK, has 
said that: 
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When the chaos that is engulfing the Middle East is taken into consideration, 
disarming is not possible… Ankara should change its stance against the Kurds… 
Turkey should develop peaceful political and economic relations [with Kurds]… 
Direct communications should be established between Ocalan [imprisoned PKK 
leader Abdullah] and Kandil [the mountains where the PKK militants are based]. And 
finally, the negotiations should officially be launched. If all these conditions are 
applied, then our arms might be silenced (Today’s Zaman 2015).  
Kurds in Syria and Turkey are slowly but surely developing their relations 
with the rest of the world. The French President Francois Hollande had a 
meeting with two senior PYD women, Asya Abdullah (the co-chair of the 
PYD) and Nesrin Abdullah (the commander of YPG’s female branch) on 8 
February 2014. There are now YPG flags on the doors and walls of the 
European Parliament and Kurdish officials now have offices across Europe. 
Kurds are welcomed by the Russian government and opened an office in 
Moscow in the name of the Rojova administration. (Tastekin 2016).  
Many of my interviewees believe that the sort of democratic autonomous 
system that Ocalan and many Kurdish nationalists currently support for 
Turkey would not only give time but would also allow some of the necessary 
preparations for a future unitary Kurdish state. Kurds already practice their 
own legal system de facto for business, family and even criminal cases as part 
of their practical resistance against the Turkish state and institutions of the 
state. This is also an integral part of the Kurdish state building project, which 
has been re-developed and introduced by the Kurdish people wherever they 
live, including the UK and German diasporas (Tas 2013a, 2013b and 2014a).  
A Case from the Kurdish Court 
As an example of this, I would like to discuss a legal case that I observed 
during my previous fieldwork in the UK with the Kurdish unofficial court 
there, the Kurdish Peace Committee. Similar Kurdish legal practices are 
carried out on a daily basis by Kurdish elected or voluntary community 
judges in Kurdish towns and cities in Turkey. 
A Turkish Businessman in the Kurdish Court9, as an example of how diaspora 
can create alternative institutions and act to solve their legal problems (Tas 
2014a). In this case a Turkish man had a joint business with another Turk. The 
two men wanted to end their partnership and one of the partners, Katip, 
asked for his financial input of £30,000 to be returned to him; Suleyman, the 
other partner, refused. Katip did not want to go to an official court because 
the partners had no written agreement. He also did not want to risk losing 
                                                 
9 This case has also been discussed in Tas (2014). All the names of case participants are pseudonyms. The 
information for this case is based on the plaintiff’s statement to the KPC; my observation of the KPC 
meeting over this case and an interview with Katip and his son, interviews November 2010. 
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any more money in a court case. His son advised him to take the issue to the 
Kurdish Peace Committee (KPC). But the father refused, saying, “instead of 
taking my case to the KPC and paying them a huge sum, Suleyman can keep 
the money.” He reasoned: “this is a Kurdish organisation and must have a 
connection with the PKK. I am not going to ask the PKK to help me. If I give 
my arm to them, they will take my whole body.” However, his son insisted, 
saying, “Please, let’s try. We won’t lose anything if we try. If they have any 
secret agenda, we will come away, I promise you.”  
In the end the father listened to his son. He took his case to the KPC on 1 
November 2010. They followed the usual procedure: filling in a short form 
and paying a fee of ten pounds. The following week, on 8 November 2010, 
both sides, the plaintiff and the defendant, came to the KPC for the meeting. 
Usually a leading KPC member makes an opening speech before a case 
begins. Especially if the judges do not know the parties involved, they might 
start by exploring the background; asking who the parties are, where they are 
from, what kind of business they have and who they know within the 
Kurdish community. Depending on the answers, they may ask how they 
heard about the work of the KPC. After getting to know the parties a little, 
they usually remind them of the rules and procedures, telling them that both 
sides will be given time and space to speak but that they should not use any 
violence or harsh words on each other. Last, but not least, they ask if both 
parties are happy to be at the KPC and if they are ready to follow and accept 
any decision the Committee might make. A similar introduction is made 
before all cases. If the judges already know the parties well, they keep it short; 
if they are less well known, the judges will ensure that both parties fully 
understand the system. After this introduction, as with all cases, both parties 
explained their position. After only around 30 minutes, the KPC decided that 
Suleyman must return the £30,000, through the KPC. 
Both sides agreed to this decision, and Suleyman wrote out a cheque. Katip 
was shocked and surprised, and then asked the KPC members: “how much 
must I pay you for this help?” The senior KPC judge answered, “You have 
already paid your ten pound fee. You do not have to pay anything more. We 
are not working for money.” Katip was still confused and then offered £2,000 
towards community work. The KPC asked Katip several times if he was sure 
that he wanted to donate money, because he was not obliged to do this. Katip 
insisted, so, after some hesitation, the KPC accepted the donation. Some 
people who have reached an agreement offer money in this way, especially 
after a business conflict. The amount is not fixed and is never asked for. Any 
donated money is usually used to help teach Kurdish; to help members of the 
community who are in need; to help run different community works; to buy 
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books or newspapers for the community; to organise meetings, seminars or 
conferences; or send to Kurdish regions if some members of the community 
are in need. Some of my Kurdish and Turkish interviewees stated that some 
of this money is spent on Kurdish guerrilla movements. 
Similar to the introduction in each case, there is usually a closing speech from 
a senior judge. Normally this includes the importance of people respecting 
each other, helping each other and being honourable (namuslu) men and 
women in the community. The judges usually remind the parties that they 
have made a promise ‘on their honour’ (namus), and that they should never 
forget this promise. After this, the case is closed, the parties leave and the next 
case begins. 
After that, Katip left the meeting room, and re-joined his son in the main 
community building. Katip told his son how surprised he was and added: “if 
a similar problem ever happens again, I know where to go.” His son replied: 
“I told you that they find solutions very quickly, and that people listen to 
them. People even come from Turkey and Germany to use the KPC.”   
In this case, neither of the parties was Kurdish but enforcement was still 
based on maintaining good social relationships. Furthermore, this type of 
alternative Kurdish community action shows that Kurds in diaspora are re-
developing their legal institutions for their own people and also as part of the 
preparation of a future autonomous or independent Kurdish state. 
This case has clearly illustrated that not just Kurdish people, but also many 
Turkish people, are not happy with the structure and work of centralised 
state institutions. Community centres, the offices of Kurdish mayors in 
Turkey, and mosques in Turkey and also in diasporas have acted as a place 
for many people looking for solutions to their disputes, when they don’t want 
use state institutions. The fact that many Turks are also using Kurdish courts 
both in diasporas and also in Turkey, when they are looking for ‘justice’, is 
important evidence that the relationship between Turks and Kurds is not 
totally broken and still can be repaired. These alternative de facto institutions, 
their work and the connections between two communities, can play a positive 
role in the development of any sustainable peace. These institutions can also 
play a role in cultural or societal reconciliation, democratisation and 
decentralisation of state institutions.  
Concluding remarks and 15 steps for sustainable peace 
Previous peace negotiations between Turks and Kurds have never been 
balanced. Messages from Ocalan about any negotiations are carried only by 
a few selected Kurdish political party members. Although any peace process 
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must necessarily be limited initially with only a few actors, as we saw in 
Northern Ireland and South Africa, there seems to have been no substantive 
progress over the last three decades. Many important Kurdish and Turkish 
entities, including the diasporas, have never been included in any substantive 
way. Diaspora, for stateless people, is not only a place outside of their country 
of origin, but can include their ancestral village or city, when insecurity and 
inequality continue there.  
Kurdish diaspora communities are the result of, and key actors in, the 
conflict. They have acted not only as an important driving engine for 
homeland politics, but also as a way forward to peace and to the development 
of future Kurdish institutions. Some elements in Kurdish diasporas have 
recently promoted a strong and even aggressive nationalism. These 
contradictions may be an important barrier for Kurdish leaders to overcome 
if there is ever going to be peace with Turkey and neighbouring states. 
Turkey, since its establishment as a Republic, has never achieved sustainable 
peace. Kurds still cannot freely learn and use their language in educational, 
legal, political and even social arenas. The PKK movement and the conflict 
between Turks and Kurds is one of the major reasons for this. The Turkish 
state has not tried to make peace in any real way, merely reiterated attempts 
at military ‘solutions’. These have not brought about any progress in the last 
hundred years, and are not moving anything forward now. Different Turkish 
governments have mouthed platitudes and postponed any real actions 
towards peace. There has never been any substantial move towards building 
trust and increasing tolerance between and within different ethnic groups.  
Successive Turkish governments did not show any understanding of the real 
sociological problems in Turkey.  
The PKK benefits from pre-existing problems of the Kurds and does not find 
it difficult to recruit new members. Thousands of young people join the PKK 
voluntarily every year (Letsch 2006b). This shows that as long as the current 
conflict continues, the PKK or similar organisations will not only exist but 
will thrive. New groups, such as the TAK or other Young Kurdish militias 
within towns and cities, are now more radical than the PKK (Kuntz et al. 
2016). 
Kurds, with the help of their international connections, may be making real 
friends for the first time. USA and Russia’s support of Kurds in Syria (YPG, 
the Kurdish People’s Protection Units) has increased Turkey’s aggression 
against the Kurds. The development of Kurdish autonomy in Syria and 
HDP’s success in Turkey have awakened Turkey’s historic fear of the state’s 
division and the unification of Kurdish lands with those in neighbouring 
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countries. For this reason all Turkish political elements (secularist, Islamist 
and nationalist) have joined forces against the Kurds.  
Especially Erdogan has used this monopoly of power for his own use. 
Erdogan’s eagerness to stay in power has moved Turkey towards an 
authoritarian regime in which freedom of expression and rule of law have 
already deteriorated. The Erdogan-led regime seems to have a zero respect 
for the rule of law if its requests or orders are not supported. Erdogan even 
spoke about removing the constitutional court because that court wanted to 
release two journalists who were arrested on his orders (Beale 2016; Ellis 2016; 
New York Times 2016; The Guardian 2016a; The Washington Post 2016). He 
has used the refugee card as a bargaining chip  with the EU to promote his 
own power (Pitel 2016b).  
He has even expanded the meaning of terrorism and suggests removing 
citizenship from the so-called ’supporters’ of terrorism, including journalists 
or academics who signed the petition for peace between Turks and Kurds 
(Reuters 2016; Zalewski 2016). He has undermined even the implementation 
of 1980s military made, monolithic and centralised constitution in many 
ways. It therefore seems very unlikely that any Erdogan-led government 
might develop a constitution which could move forward many of the issues 
plaguing Turkey, let alone the Turkish-Kurdish conflict.  
Any critical media has been taken under state control. Even social media, like 
Facebook and Twitter, have been switched on and off at government will. 
Critical voices, especially pro-Kurdish journalists, have been arrested. As of 
April 2016, almost 40 journalists and tens of lawyers are in prison. Hundreds 
of academics who, in January 2016, signed a peace petition against state 
oppression and operations against the Kurds have faced disciplinary actions. 
Many of them have been put in pre-trial detention, and are facing several 
years in prison, on the personal orders of Erdogan. Erdogan has been 
eliminating all opposition ahead of his bid for an executive or Sultan style of 
presidency, and he regards the Kurds as the main barrier to achieving this.  
Many Kurds I have interviewed in Diyarbakir, Istanbul, Berlin and London 
are angry with both the Erdogan-led AKP goverment’s brutal response to 
Kurds and also with the PKK for taking the fight to the towns and cities and 
moving away from any peace talks.  
The question of what the Kurds want has been asked by many politicians, 
international organisations, journalists and academics. First of all, it is 
important to acknowledge that Kurds, like many other communties and 
nations, do not speak with one voice. Even the PKK has diverse voices, 
including Kandil, Ocalan, the Young Kurds, or youth militia and diasporas. 
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There is also a wide range of other Kurds, including Alevi Kurds, women’s 
rights organisations, HDP and youth organisations and conservative 
religious Kurds. All these sub groups may well contradict each other. 
Looking at the bigger picture, when south Kurdistan (KRG), East Kurdistan 
(Iran), Rojova (Syria) and North Kurdistan (Turkey) are included,  the 
diversity increases. One of my interviewees commented: “Kurds do not need 
any more enemies, they have themselves. They are a nation with many armies 
and divisions.“ 
Many Turkish or western academics, journalists and diplomats use this 
heterogeneity and the lack of a single representative as an excuse not to 
negotiate with Kurds. They have suggested that Kurds cannot be a nation. 
But Turks, Britons and Germans are similarly heterogenous. Just like Turks, 
Britons, Germans and all other nations, Kurds have some common issues and 
wishes, and representatives who will argue for these.   
15 important steps towards sustainable peace 
This article has already discussed why the previous peace negotiations have 
failed. Looking forward towards possible solutions for a ‘one state solution’, 
I contend that there are 15 important steps which must be fulfilled for 
sustainable peace.  
First, the Turkish state and the PKK should declare a ceasefire for at least one 
year. This would create the necessary conditions for peace talks to begin.  
Second, international involvement and guarantees are essential. The 
European Union and United States must put pressure on the Turkish 
government to promote peace and also to equalise unequal conditions among 
stakeholders for the peace table. There is an international historical context, 
with effects on international stability and important human rights issues to 
consider. These all mean that there is a wide international responsibility to 
observe, oversee, and to take an active part in facilitating the peace process.  
Third, the Kurdish leader in Turkey, Abdullah Ocalan should be released 
from prison. This is a necessary pre-condition before any real peace process 
can begin. Only free and equal people can talk and make peace.  
Fourth, any peace talks should be inclusive and involve all key stakeholders. 
Not only the AKP and PKK, but other important Kurdish and Turkish 
stakeholders, especially women’s groups, should take part in the peace 
discussions. With Kurdish populations living in their historical regions in 
Syria, Iraq, Iran and Turkey, as well as in the diasporas, one cannot separate 
the Kurdish and Turkish ‘peace process’ from ongoing conflicts and wars in 
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the neighbouring countries. Many of the Kurds I interviewed believe that for 
any successful and permanent peace, Kurds living in all of these places, 
including the diasporas, must be involved in the peace process. 
Fifth, the objectives of the peace process should be clearly defined. Each step 
should be accepted, with time frames agreed by all sides.  
Sixth, independent justice, the disarmament of Kurdish fighters, and a 
reconciliation process with amnesty for all political prisoners, must be 
implemented if any peace process and subsequent coexistence is to be 
successful in the long term.  
Seventh, as in many other societies with a history of conflict, Turkey needs a 
new, more inclusive constitution if it is to move away from the existing 
problems. The country is still using the constitution created by the military 
after the 1980 coup. The new constitution and any amendments affecting its 
Basic Rights and Turkey’s ethnic communities cannot be approved without a 
qualified majority of two-thirds of votes, within which there must be a 
majority of votes from the Kurdish community. This should hopefully protect 
the constitution from any majoritarian or authoritarian ruler in the future.  
Eighth, the existence and distinct identity of Turkey’s different ethnic and 
religious groups such as the Kurds should be recognised and protected in the 
new constitution’s basic rights. The concepts of one religion, one nation, or 
brotherhood cannot keep Turks, Kurds and any other groups together if there 
is no tolerance of differences. Without tolerance, the idea of one umbrella 
identity can only be a temporary solution, and will not resolve the Turkish-
Kurdish problems that have been observed for a century. Pluralistic society 
is a fact and one person should not be forced to wear someone else’s hat. Any 
peaceful society requires tolerance and respect. As Adorno (1991) and also 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985) have emphasised, the appreciation of diversity 
means to be diverse without being frightened, and to respect and tolerate the 
value of others.  
Ninth, respect for the rule of law and democratic values, freedom of speech, 
freedom of the media, the promotion of gender, ethnic and religious equality 
at all levels, and decentralisation should be part of the basic rights included 
in any new constitution. The new constitution should also include a way for 
Kurds and other minority groups to be part of truly democratic politics. This 
means that the removal of the current 10 percent parliamentary threshold is 
necessary.  
Tenth, devolution or federalism can contribute to a resolution of almost one 
hundred years of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, since the unitary and 
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centralist system has been a significant contributor to the conflict. The new 
constitution should decentralise power down to elected co-mayors in the 
towns and cities, rather than to centrally-appointed governors. Kurds have 
already successfully introduced and practice a system of co-mayors and co-
chairs that promotes gender equality. Political, administrative and fiscal 
decentralisation, with the creation of local police forces would contribute to a 
new, peaceful and pluralistic one-state solution for Turks and Kurds. 
Education, healthcare, economic development and sport activities should be 
decentralised. The constitution should also permit the use of Kurdish as a 
working language in areas where the Kurds form the majority. Such 
multilingual practices have already been practised successfully in South 
Tyrol (Italy), Catalan and Basque regions (Spain) and Quebec (Canada).  
Eleventh, various consociational power-sharing principles advocated by 
Arend Lijphart should be reflected in the new constitution (Lijphart 1977 and 
2008). Examples should include the future formation of coalition 
governments which represents all major segments of the divided society, 
including the Kurds; proportionality in legislative and executive bodies such 
as the the Constitutional Court, and within the public administration and 
allocation of public funds; minority veto rights on all essential decisions and 
the existence of arbitration mechanisms. 
Twelfth, a new pluralistic and inclusive state should include full education 
in the Kurdish language. Primary through to university level education 
should be state funded, as it is in the Republic of Macedonia where education 
in the Albanian language is available at all levels (Lyon 2016). South Tyrol 
(Italy), Catalan and Basque regions (Spain) and Quebec (Canada) are just a 
few other important successful examples.  
Thirteenth, use of community flags and symbols should be allowed in areas 
where minority groups form the majority. In the long term it may be 
necessary to create a new, inclusive state flag for all as was the case in South 
Africa. 
Fourteenth, economic development in the Kurdish areas is one of the most 
important steps for ensuring sustainable peace. The long-term conflict has 
created social and economic inequalities, which fuel yet further conflict. 
There should be an aim to remove social and economic inequalities between 
different parts of Turkey. This might require, for a limited period of time, 
positive discrimination in Kurdish areas. 
Fifteenth, the substantial post-conflict ecological and environmental damage 
in Kurdish areas should be repaired according to local historical and cultural 
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values. The replacement of forests and sustainable local water resources is 
just as important as the renovation of historical monuments. 
Political and constitutional changes need to be adopted, appreciated and 
practiced not only by the state, but across society. All these elements 
underline how peace could be managed in conflicted societies.  
Especially during the past two decades, many of the nation states that rejected 
plurality have faced civil war and, usually, division. The former Yugoslavia, 
Iraq, Syria and Sudan are just a few examples. Many more accommodating 
countries have accepted, respected and made space for their ethnic diversity. 
As discussed in more detail in Tas (2014b), with the help of the Millet Practice, 
the Ottoman Empire managed to keep together its very diverse society for 
more than five centuries. Switzerland has successfully managed its diversity 
under a confederal system since 1815. The Scots, Welsh and Northern Irish 
have their own devolved administrations in the UK. Germany has sixteen 
federal states. Spain is increasingly making space for Catalan and Basque 
power. Macedonia has avoided civil war by enshrining in its constitution a 
decentralised model of governance (Lyon 2016). 
Kurds have already established some de facto institutions during the ongoing 
conflict. The current, centralistic, authoritarian state position of Turkey may 
not be able to persist for much longer. If the state breaks down any further, 
Turkey will be left in as brutal a situation as Yugoslavia, Iraq, Sudan and 
Syria. And Europe will have an even larger flood of incoming refugees. 
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